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CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION-STATE AID TO
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN NEW MEXICO
Article VIII, Section 6 of the proposed New Mexico Constitution
prohibits aid to private enterprise:
Neither the state nor any political subdivision therof, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall lend or pledge its credit, or
make any donation either directly or indirectly to or in aid of any person, association, or public or private corporation. Nothing contained
herein shall prohibit the state or its local subdivisions from making
provision for the care and maintenance of sick and indigent persons.
The Constitutional Revision Commission has consolidated and
shortened Article IX, Section 14 and Article IV, Section 31 of the
existing constitution to form Section 6. They report that Article IX,
Section 14 has proven of "extreme value in the past" and strongly
recommend its retention in any new state constitution on the grounds
that it prevents incursions upon state and local treasuries for nongovernmental purposes.'
The revision is substantively the same prohibition of aid to private
enterprise as is found in the present constitution. So extensive a restriction on the legislature merits careful appraisal of 1) the value
of the underlying policy expressed by the provision and 2) the consequence of giving constitutional weight to the policy.
A law designed to promote economic development in New Mexico
had been approved March 16, 1967,2 to become effective on passage
of a constitutional amendment.' It provided for the creation of a
state economic development authority with power to make secured
loans to local non-profit industrial and economic development agencies for the establishment of industrial or other enterprises.
The legislature has taken the position that economic insecurity and
consequent indigency due to unemployment is a menace to the entire
state. The state's investment in youth and training is a valuable resource which can only be preserved by creating employment opportunities. Increase in employment with coincident increase in homes,
real property and corporate incomes will increase the tax base of the
1. Report of New Mexico Constitutional Revision Commission 118 (1967).
2. N.M. Laws 1967, ch. 89, § 2.
3. N.M. Const. art. IX, § 14 (Interim Supp. 1968). An amendment to Article IX,
Section 14 was defeated November 7, 1967: 31,019 against and 22,353 in favor. The
amendment provided that the state or any political subdivision would not be prohibited
from creating new job opportunities, decreasing unemployment, or improving the state's
economy with loans to encourage economic development.
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state, permitting it to support education and other state services.
These advantages are best secured by promoting commerce, industry, and other job producing enterprises. 4 At the present time, the
legislature is precluded by Article IX, Section 14, from promoting
such economic development with state financial resources.5
The constitutional limitations on state industrial financing have
roots in the railroad-bond debacle of the 19th Century. During the
1830's and 1840's burgeoning eastern business created a demand for
development of railroads and canals, and as pressure mounted for
longer railroads to penetrate more sparsely settled areas, private
capital was not readily forthcoming. A demand for use of public
credit developed. During the mid-19th Century, several states filled
the financial vacuum by extending credit or borrowing in order to
purchase railroad shares.6
The panic of 1873 resulted in eight states defaulting or repudiating
debts of this type.' This had a sobering effect on the public and gave
rise to the adoption of state constitutional debt limitations.
Early state debt restrictions did not generally apply to political
subdivisions. State legislatures remained free to encourage counties
and municipalities to incur debt in aid of railroad construction. When
many railroad lines were abandoned as unprofitable, the credit of
the municipalities which had financed them was impaired. Constitutional amendments were then adopted to restrict the financial activities of political subdivisions. Provisions requiring electorate
approval of borrowing and prohibitions against financial aid to private enterprise emerged as the principal constitutional limitations.
Some states adopted additional prohibitions barring loans, donations
or gifts of land.'
4. Id.

5. N.M. Const. art. IX, § 14.
Neither the state, nor the county, school district, or municipality, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge its
credit, or make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or public or
private corporation, or in aid of any private enterprise for the construction of
any railroad; provided, nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the state
or any county or municipality from making provision for the care and maintenance of sick and indigent persons.
6. A. Heins, Constitutional Restrictions Against State Debt 3 (1963).
7. Id. at 7, indicating default in the following order: Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas,
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Maryland, Pennsylvania.
8. N.M. Const. art. IV, § 31.
No appropriation shall be made for charitable, educational or other benevolent
purposes to any person, corporation, association, institution or community, not
under the absolute control of the state, but the legislature may, in its discretion,
make appropriation for the charitable institutions and hospitals, for the maintenance of which annual appropriations were made by the legislative assembly
of 1909.
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The two specific vices to which public aid limitations were addressed were the "lending of credit" and unsupervised private control of planning and development. The railroad aid schemes involved
marketing state and municipal obligations which were delivered to
the railroad as a donation or in exchange for shares. The corporation
then disposed of them as it saw fit, often selling them at 65 to 70
cents on the dollar. Private corporate control was grossly inadequate
to safeguard the public interest. For all practical purposes, there was
no public control over the planning of the project or the expenditure
of public funds. The end result was an enormous burden of public
debt as the sole reminder of frustrated public purpose.'
This colorful chapter of American history records a total abdication of governmental responsibility. The public was left with little
stomach for new adventures in financing economic progress. This
was confirmed when the power to perpetrate such disasters was withdrawn from the legislature. Public aid limitations were designed to
restrict government involvement in private ventures. Forty-five state
constitutions impose limitations on lending of credit to private enterprise, 10 and Article IX, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution
is an illustration of the standard provisions."
New Mexico is faced with the problem of attracting industry to
the state and, as in the railroad-bond era, private capital is not
readily forthcoming. Increasing proportions of savings are going
into institutional forms-life insurance, savings and loan associations, government bonds, pension funds and trusts. Legal and economic factors limit the power of these financial intermediaries to
invest in long term obligations or in equities. State laws generally
fix the maximum amount of loans that can be made by commercial
banks so as to restrict the ability of many of them to make long term
loans for plant construction. 2 Moreover, commercial banks must
keep their loans quite liquid and are therefore limited to short or
intermediate terms.
In New Mexico, state bank loans are limited to 20% of their
capital and surplus to any one customer.' 3 As a practical matter, this
9. Pinksy, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical andEconomic Approach, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 265, 280 (1963).
10. Comment, Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing, 41 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 135, 136 n.8 (1969).
11. N.M. Const. art. IX, § 14.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 48-22-20 and -21 (Repl. 1966) cover reserves against deposits
for state banks and loans of commercial banks.
13. Compliance with federal reserve requirements satisfies state requirements. N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 48-2-28 (Repl. 1966). For state banks which do meet federal reserve requirements, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831 (1969), sets the

ground rules.
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limits many small New Mexico banks to $50,000 or under. The
large banks in northern New Mexico may, of course, make loans
throughout the state or in connection with corresponding local banks.
In the absence of corresponding banks, however, such loans are
rarely made. The result is that capital for local economic develop14
ment is exceedingly restricted.
The problem common to all the states struggling to develop or
redevelop diversified economies is curtailed availability of long-term
capital for small business, particularly manufacturing units. New
Mexico and all those states which have felt the need for public industrial financing have had to devise methods to raise required
funds. To a greater or lesser extent, the solutions have been based
on using public financial resources to subsidize private industry.
The diverse methods utilized by states in fostering economic development have been shaped as much by constitutional limitations as
by specific regional problems. In some states, constitutional amendment has smoothed the way; in others, the courts have upheld legislative enactments attacked on constitutional grounds. The courts
developed a "public purpose" doctrine to justify the state programs.15 Simply stated, the courts looked to the policy behind public
aid limitations and if factors of 1 ) urgent necessity and 2) adequate
public control to effectuate the public purpose were present, the financing legislation was upheld.
A survey of the various methods of state industrial financing is
useful to a critical study of the New Mexico solution. It should be
clearly understood at the outset that the New Mexico solution was
achieved by the broadest possible interpretation of the present constitutional limitations.
The Mississippi plan was the beginning of modern state industrial financing. It began in 1936 with the enactment of a plan to
meet immediate and long term problems.16 The impact of the depression was severe on the basically agricultural economy, and unemployment was acute. Per capita income was a disheartening 41 %
of the national average. 1 7 The plan authorized municipalities to
issue general obligation bonds on approval of the general electorate.
Issuance was permitted on approval of a state agency based on findings of sufficient natural resources and labor to support the proposed
industry, and evidence that the project would in fact promote the
14. Pinksy, supra note 9, at 273.
15. Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing for Industrial Development, 70 Yale L.J. 789 (1961).
16. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 8936-05, 8938-08 (1957, Supp. 1968).
17. Pinksy, supra note 9, at 267, quoting from Survey of Current Business at 15 (Aug.
1949).
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objectives of the act. Thus financed, the municipality could construct
and equip a plant, then effect a long term lease to private industry.
Initially, nominal rentals made this plan an outright subsidy. At
present, the objective is to fix rentals to amortize the bonded indebtedness within the primary term of the lease. The Supreme Court of
Mississippi upheld the statute in 1938 in the landmark case of Al1britton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal
dismissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938). The public purpose doctrine
enunciated by the court operated as a counterweight to the constitutional limitation. Related decisions have split on Aibritton. Courts
have also split on the validity of revenue bond plans. It is significant
that of the five states in which industrial financing legislation was
invalidated, all had per capita income levels of 80 % of the average
national rate or better.' 8 The constitutional relevance of economic
factors is felt by the courts even though it is not stated.
The revenue bond plan is the approach used by New Mexico.
Municipalities are authorized to finance the construction and equipping of industrial plants by the issuance of revenue bonds. Although
modeled on the Mississippi plan, it is different in that the bonds
are payable only from income produced by the facility rather than
from general taxes. Although the revenue bonds do not rest entirely
upon the credit of the municipality, they offer many features to the
investor as attractive as general obligation bonds. The land and
facility are generally exempt from property taxes, the interest rate
is lower than many small enterprises could ordinarily obtain, and the
interest is exempt from federal income taxes. Many states make revenue bonds authorized investments for savings banks and insurance
companies.' 9
The Pennsylvania plan is intended to meet problems significantly
different from those of New Mexico. Its efforts are bent toward reorganizing and redeveloping industry in areas which suffer a labor
surplus as a consequence of severe decline of sectors of the state's
economy. The Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority is
given authority to make second mortgage loans from appropriations
out of current revenues for industrial plan construction in areas of
the state which have a substantial labor surplus as defined in the act.2 °
18. Id. at 326, Table I.
19. N.M. Laws 1955, ch. 234, created an industrial revenue bond plan for New
Mexico. This statute was held constitutional by the New Mexico supreme court in an
opinion which showed a clear awareness of the economic factors involved. Village of
Deming v. Hosdreg, 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956). For general coverage of the
New Mexico solution see Armstrong, Municipal Inducements-The New Mexico Commercial and Industrial Project Revenue Bond, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 58 (1960).
20. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 301 (1960).
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The loans are made to local non-profit industrial development corporations which in turn lease the factories to private enterprises.
The New England plan meets problems similar to those in Pennsylvania. Maine, Rhode Island and Vermont created agencies with
power to insure long-term first mortgage loans by pledging the credit
of the state. 2 They may be insured in amounts as high as 90% of
the project cost. The mortgagor must be a non-profit development
corporation which intends to sell or lease the property to private
manufacturers. Both the Pennsylvania and New England plans encourage the maximum possible financing from private investment
sources. Both plans use a statewide tax base in contrast to the Mississippi plan. State and federal tax exemptions play a minor role in
these plans, again in contrast to the Mississippi plan.
Oklahoma, pursuant to constitutional amendment, adopted legislation creating a state authority with the power to make second mortgage loans to local development corporations financing industrial
development. Funds are obtained by issuing general obligation
bonds, not to exceed 25 %of the total value of the property and not
to exceed in the aggregate $10,000,000.22
New Mexico attempted to follow the last three plans. The New
Mexico Economic Development Authority 3 may be viewed as an
attempt to attract private investment capital. The proposed Authority was to contract secured loans not in excess of 30% of the estimated cost of the project, provided that the development agency
holds not less than 20 % of the estimated cost of the project in funds
or property and has obtained from independent sources a firm commitment for all other funds above the loan of the Authority. This
represents a very moderate extension of state credit compared to
Mississippi, which has the authority to extend 100% of the estimated cost, and the New England plan which guarantees 90% of
the private investment in the project.
Accepting for purposes of discussion the need in New Mexico for
economic development, we must also accept the fact that the state
21. Maine found constitutional amendment necessary to make way for appropriate
legislation. Me. Const. art. IX, § 14-A; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 701-03, 751-53
(1964, Supp. 1968). Rhode Island was able to comply with the constitutional restrictions
in passing legislation. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§42-34-1 to -18 (Supp. 1967). Vermont
was happily spared these time-consuming problems, its constitution having no public
aid restrictions. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 201-15 (Supp. 1968).
22. Okla. Const. art. X, § 34; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, §§ 851-61 (1965, Supp. 1968).
Section 34 permits the legislature to raise the limit to $20,000,000 after three years from
the date of amendment. This has been done. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 876 (Supp. 1968).
23. N.M. Laws 1967, ch. 89, § 2. This law was contingent on the amendment of
Article IX, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution. The amendment failed and the
New Mexico Economic Development Authority was stillborn.
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will be expected to take affirmative action to supply the need. This
is consonant with current service-oriented concepts of government.
Even in its restriction on aid to private enterprise, the constitution
openly recognizes that the needs of the state are the ultimate responsibility of the state. The existing constitution makes an exception in
its limitation for the sick and the indigent, which Section 6 retains.
The scope for legislative irresponsibility is as vast in underwriting
the non-productive sectors of society as it would be in underwriting
the productive members. Even so, the public obligation to aid the
sick and indigent is not hampered by constitutional restrictions on
legislative action.
Following the logic of balancing risk of abuse against necessity
for action, another exception could be grafted to Section 6, e.g., aid
to economically undeveloped areas as a function of aid to the indigent. This limited change would have merit if constitutional amendment were the issue. However, the Convention has an obligation to
clearly express governmental policies which are not inconsistent with
growth. If the state constitution is not written for all time, it should
at least be written for a long time.2 4
Over the past 30 years a respectable number of states, including
New Mexico, have attempted to foster economic development. The
24. See generally, National Municipal League, Salient Issues of Constitutional Revision (J. Wheeler ed. 1961).
25. States which have grappled with their economic problems by legislation incidentally express a modern view of the purpose of state government.
It is the duty of government to promote the public welfare by fostering commercial growth and developing the personal and material resources of the
state. In order to provide resources for the support of education, the administration of justice and the service of government and to promote and develop the
education and commercial interests, the material resources and general prosperity of a free people, there is a state-wide need for increased employment
opportunity. [Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 201 (Supp. 1968).]
. . . It is also declared that it is in the interest of the public welfare and purpose to promote the expansion and diversification of industry, to increase employment and to provide a larger taxable base for the economy of the state ...
[R.I. Gen. Laws. Ann. § 42-34-2 (Supp. 1967).]
The Pennsylvania Industrial Authority was created to
: * * operate for the public purpose of alleviating unemployment with its resulting spread of indigency and economic stagnation by the promotion and development of industry and manufacturing enterprises. . . . [Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73,
§ 302 (Supp. 1969).]
Of particular interest is the further finding and declaration of policy after the Pennsylvania Industrial Authority had been in operation.
That as a result of the activity of the Pennsylvania Development Authority in
making available financial assistance to local industrial development agencies
and as a result of the recent high level of the national economy, unemployment
has been greatly reduced . . . the rate of migration from the Commonwealth
has been slowed and the general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth
has been improved. [Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 302.1 (a) (Supp. 1969).]
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question facing the Convention is whether such attempts are an appropriate exercise of governmental power. It is not enough to maintain constitutional barriers against spending government funds for
non-governmental purposes as is recommended by the Constitutional
Revision Commission. A decision must be reached as to what are,
in fact, governmental purposes.
In reaching a decision on this fundamental concept, the Convention may profitably consider the position taken by the Alaska Constitutional Convention. They declared that their purpose was to
produce a constitution which would:
1) Allow for the great changes the future might bring to the state;
and
2) Provide for a government that is energetic in fostering the growth
26
and development of the whole state and the welfare of all the people.
Such a purpose is consistent with the view of the New Mexico supreme court in its rejection of a constitutional attack on municipal
revenue bonds:
The effort to bolster the sagging economy in and around some of our
cities and towns over the state is, of course, entirely commendable.
The closing of the coal mines in Colfax County, the drought in other
sections of the state, as well as untoward economic factors elsewhere,
all have been the cause of deep, statewide concern. Any movement reasonably calculated to improve the economic welfare of the people as a
whole through furnishing employment, promoting industry and trade,
and inspiring new hope, seems well worthwhile. Whether the present
enactment will achieve these aims, none can tell. Only trial, effort and
27
actual experience can give the answer.

The position is certainly persuasive, but it is not adequately reflected
in either the present or the proposed New Mexico constitution.
The judiciary has gone as far as it can go in freeing the legislature
from constitutional obstruction in this area.2 s The Constitutional
26. National Municipal League, supra note 24, at 170, quoting from A Report to
the People of Alaska from the Alaska Constitutional Convention (College, Alaska, the
Convention, Feb. 1956).
27. Village of Deming v. Hosdreg, 62 N.M. 18, 35, 303 P.2d 920, 931 (1956).
28. Id. at 26, 303 P.2d at 925. The New Mexico supreme court held that revenue
bond plans do not violate the credit clause because no "debt" or pecuniary liability is
incurred within the meaning of the constitutional restriction. This is because the general
credit of the municipality is not pledged. By implication the opinion also holds that the
public purpose is sufficiently compelling to make the plan an appropriate exercise of
municipal power.
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Convention has a rare opportunity to build anew; it is not limited to
patchwork. Section 6 should be drafted to provide:
No tax shall be levied or appropriation of public money made or prop-

erty transferred
nor shall public credit be used except for a public
29
purpose.

Such a provision may not usher in the golden age of industrial prosperity, but it will no longer constrict legislative power to foster economic growth if it seems feasible to do so. Moreover, public
protection would not be sacrificed. Any legislative plan would be
subject to scrutiny in terms of threatened abuses and intended benefits. Ultimately the courts have authority to give meaning to "public
purpose." This provision would enable the judiciary to make a decision based on an economic understanding of the times without doing violence to either the letter or the spirit of the constitution.
GLORIA LYONS

29. Alaska Const. art IX, § 6.

